The UN is used to 'outsourcing' or 'contracting out' its peacekeeping functions but, traditionally, this has been to states willing to contribute troops to an operation under overall UN command and control. This model itself has created tensions between contributing states and the UN. Given these conditions, and the fact that international law is traditionally seen as primarily applicable to states, it seems even more legally problematic that the UN has, in recent years, started to outsource certain peacekeeping functions to the private sector. Inevitably, issues of applicable international laws, lines of responsibility and mechanisms for accountability, are less clear. In recent years the UN has addressed this new practice by adopting a series of guidelines and polices on armed security contractors. The aim of this paper is to analyse these current UN policies in the light of their compatibility with international law, particularly international human rights law. 
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Introduction
In a sense the UN is used to 'outsourcing' or 'contracting out' its peacekeeping functions, but this has traditionally been to states willing to contribute troops to an operation under overall UN command and control. This model itself has created tensions between contributing states' command structures, military discipline and rules of engagement on the one hand, and the UN's overall command, control and rules of engagement on the other. In 2 terms of responsibility for any wrongful acts of peacekeepers, there remains lack of clarity as to whether a UN peacekeeping operation is a subsidiary organ of the UN, which would mean that legal responsibility for any wrongful acts is that of the UN, 1 or whether a peacekeeping force consists of organs of members states placed at the disposal of the UN where the UN is only responsible if it is in effective control of the conduct in question. 2 UN doctrine seems unclear on this despite practice dating back to the first force emplaced in Suez in 1956. 3 Given these conditions and the fact that international law is traditionally seen as applicable primarily to states and, only more recently, to inter-governmental organisations, it seems even more legally problematic that the UN has, in recent years, 4 started to outsource certain peacekeeping functions in some peace operations to the private sector. Inevitably, issues of applicable international laws, lines of responsibility and mechanisms for accountability, are less clear. To its credit, however, the UN has recently tried to address this new outsourcing practice by adopting a series of guidelines and polices on armed security contractors. The aim of this paper is to analyse these current UN policies on the use of private security companies/contractors (PSCs) in peace operations in the light of the compatibility of these policies with international law, particularly international human rights law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law.
Although states contributing forces to peacekeeping (troop contributing nations -TCNs) may include contractors as part of their contributions, the focus of this paper will be on the 3 UN's obligations under international law when directly engaging PSCs. The point here is that the UN is obliged to ensure that human rights law and humanitarian law are respected by private contractors, not just as a matter of policy, but of international law. Although the UN is not bound by treaty law on human rights or international humanitarian law it is bound by customary laws, many of which it has partly been responsible for initiating (for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948).
After establishing that the UN is bound by international law, the paper identifies the UN's due diligence obligations under international human rights law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law, particularly as regards the use of lethal force by PSCs. Given that we are considering armed contractors performing certain functions for the UN, it is argued that the UN has an overriding and central concern to ensure that its policies as regards PSCs comply with human rights law and, where applicable, international humanitarian law on when lethal force is permitted. 5 Of course there will be other due diligence obligations on the UN when engaging contractors (for example, as regards detention and treatment by PSCs) but, as this article shows, these follow the same pattern.
UN's Obligations under International Human Rights Law
The UN, as an international legal person, has rights and duties under international law. 6 Exceptionally such rights and duties might arise under international treaties or agreements such as host state agreements, but the backbone of its duties derive from customary international law, on which there is a very detailed study regarding international humanitarian law by the ICRC. 7 The International Law Commission (ILC) adopted Articles on 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 the Responsibility of International Organisations in 2011, which clearly show that it is possible to attribute wrongful acts to the UN, 8 and that such responsibility is premised on the UN having duties under customary international law including ones to uphold and protect human rights.
As well as ensuring that its peacekeepers do not violate human rights, the UN also has an obligation to ensure that private persons or entities, particularly ones over which it has a degree of control, do not violate human rights. That responsibility can arise from a failure to fulfil these positive obligations of due diligence is referenced in 20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 contractors who may potentially (despite the UN's best efforts) become engaged as civilians directly participating in hostilities under international humanitarian law. However, given the restrictions put on the type of functions that PSCs can perform within UN peace operations (as evidenced in the review of policies in section 3 of this paper), this scenario is highly unlikely and, therefore, international humanitarian law will, only exceptionally, be the applicable law, instead the relevant framework is international human rights law. In exceptional circumstances when an armed conflict erupts in a situation where a peace operation is deployed, peacekeepers (acting under the Chapter VII elements of their mandate) may become engaged as combatants in that conflict. However, PSCs are not contracted to take offensive military action but to defend UN personnel and property and therefore their activities primarily remain governed by human rights law even during an armed conflict.
Given that contractors are not viewed as 'agents' of the UN, for whose actions the UN is directly responsible, 16 the UN will be responsible for their actions which violate human rights when in effective control of contractors, 17 but this level of control is unlikely. This, however, does not leave a responsibility gap -the UN remains responsible for some of its omissions which result in a violation of human rights by PSCs operating under a UN contract -so called positive obligations, alternatively labeled duties of due diligence. These obligations are not absolute, rather they are obligations of conduct; so the UN could be fulfilling its due diligence obligations even when contractor abuse occurs, if the UN has acted appropriately.
Nevertheless, they require the UN to take certain measures (identified in the next section) to reduce the risk of human rights violation by contractors, to respond to any violations, and to provide access to justice when such violations occur.
UN's Obligations Regarding the Use of Lethal Force
Having established that human rights law is normally applicable to the UN and, therefore, should be respected by UN peacekeepers and armed contractors engaged by the UN, we need to establish more precisely the obligations that the UN has when deploying armed personnel to post-conflict situations where there is a high degree of risk that lethal force will 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 be used. Major human rights treaties make it clear that the right to life, though fundamental, is not absolute.The basic principle is that life cannot be taken arbitrarily.
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Human rights jurisprudence shows that lethal force can be used when absolutely necessary for self-defence (including defence of third parties), to effect an arrest or prevent escape of a detainee, or in action taken to quell a riot or insurrection.
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In the case of armed contractors engaged by the UN, the fact that they do not (nor should have) the power of arrest or detention or, indeed, the right or duty to deal with riots or insurrections, signifies that they can only use lethal force in cases of absolute necessity when defending themselves or a third party under imminent threat. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 measures to protect the right. 23 The UN itself has recognised that it has such obligations in 26 Access to justice for victims should also be included in the last obligation, including non-judicial avenues of redress. Before looking at the UN's policies on PSC's, the article details the UN's fulfilment of these positive obligations primarily in relation to the peacekeeping and police elements of a peace operation, where the UN is relying on states to send troops or police.
UN Law Governing Lethal Force
There are a number of UN documents (more for UN police than for peacekeepers) specifying when lethal force can be used; they are primarily concerned with refining the notion of self- As a 'standard' this leaves a great deal to be desired, potentially encouraging broad interpretations of when deadly force can be used and when weapons can be fired, for instance 'pre-emptively'. Furthermore, although it is true to say that the impartial enforcement of a protection mandate should not distinguish between state and non-state actors who threaten civilians, the fact is that action against the government will constitute enforcement action rather than peacekeeping.
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The issue of pre-deployment training of armed contractors is discussed below, although this brief overview suggests that it is not satisfactory in the case of regular peacekeepers. The UN must be careful to restrict PSCs so as not to enable or empower them to operate under the Chapter VII 'necessary measures' elements of the mandate. While the military components of the peace operation can operate under the enforcement aspects of the mandate, PSCs cannot as they are confined in law to self-defence and defence of third parties under imminent existential threat.
Adequate Planning and Risk Assessment
Training, no matter how comprehensive, will only be effective if there has been adequate planning and risk assessment so that the force deployed is capable of meeting the exigencies of the situation and environment it is deployed to. This is recognised by the UN's Capstone Doctrine 2008 (containing peacekeeping principles and guidelines):
The Secretariat has a responsibility to provide the Security Council with an accurate assessment of the risks associated with its decision to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and ensure that its mandate and capabilities are tailored to the requirements of the situation.
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However, the realities of putting a peace operation together often result in operations that are, at least initially, inadequate for the task.
The reality is that in the deployment period up to full complement, the greatest risk is to civilians, UN personnel and to the peace process, not from the arbitrary use of force by UN personnel but from on-going violence committed by non-state actors. There may be a temptation to use significant numbers of readily available armed contractors to fill the gap, while regular military and police personnel from TCN's are deployed, but this must be tempered, as it is in this initial stage when there is most danger to the UN in establishing peace. Given that armed contractors can only defend themselves and civilians under imminent attack then they could be deployed in this initial period in limited numbers in limited circumstances to protect refugee camps, for instance, where lives are immediately at stake. But to deploy them more widely into a violent situation, where offensive force is required to consolidate the peace, would entail a significant risk of dragging them into a conflict situation.
Investigation and Access to Justice
Arguably, even in the exceptional circumstances of armed conflict, independent investigation of uses of lethal force by UN peacekeepers, police or contractors, as well as 
UN's Policies and Guidelines For Contractors under Human Rights Law
Having established that the UN is bound by human rights law and that this entails a number of positive obligations when deploying armed personnel to post-conflict situations, and having highlighted how far the UN has gone towards implementing these obligations in relation to UN peacekeepers and UN police and, while doing this, taking the opportunity to flag up some potential difficulties in applying these standards to armed contractors, the purpose of this section is to review the UN's recent policies on contractors in the light of its positive obligations. Before looking at each of the positive obligations outlined in section 3, it is first necessary to consider the functions envisaged for PSCs in the UN's policies and guidelines, and consider their compatibility with international law especially human rights law. 
PSC Functions and International Human Rights Law
The UN's Policy on PSCs 2012 states that PSCs cannot be contracted by the UN except on an exceptional basis to perform functions of protecting UN personnel, premises and property, and to provide mobile protection of UN personnel and property. 44 In the UN's Guidelines on PSCs 2012 more detail is given of basic PSC functions when protecting UN personnel and property to include: using electronic search equipment, personnel and vehicle searches, visitor control systems, identifying and reporting suspicious persons or objects and, probably most controversially, containing or removing suspicious persons or objects which may cause a security concern. 45 As long as the latter is not interpreted to include arrest or detention (and the wording seems chosen to avoid this interpretation but to still allow PSCs to deal with threats) and as long as suspects are handed over to the host state or to UN peacekeepers (or released within a very short period), then this appears to be a suitably limited range of functions; ones that do not trespass on the roles of the host states or sending states or, indeed, the UN in performing law enforcement functions. The basic functions of PSCs when providing mobile protection services include: preventing vehicles from intercepting the convoy, extracting the convoy from ambush sites, and clearing the route to enable convoy movement, 46 functions which might suggest more coercive action but any use of force in this regard will be a response to an attack as discussed below. What follows is centred upon an analysis of when force might be used by PSCs and the compatibility of those conditions with the right to life under human rights law.
Law on when Lethal Force can be used by PSCs
The UN's Policy on PSCs 2012 states that the objective of PSCs working for the UN is to 'provide a visible deterrent to potential attackers and an armed response to repel any attack consistent with the' UN's Use of Force Policy 2011, host state legislation and international law. 47 It goes on the say that the PSCs policy should also be consistent with the International Code for Private Security Providers 2010. 48 The UN's Guidelines on PSCs 2012 envisage PSCs 44 UN's Policy on PSCs 2012 (n.5), para.9. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid., para.11. 47 Ibid., para.8. 48 Ibid., para. 51 Ibid., para.5. 52 Ibid., para.6. 53 Ibid., para10. 54 Ibid., para.11 .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 imminent threat it also includes the use of lethal force to prevent serious crime. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 borne attacks and armed assault). 62 The suggestion that PSCs should be actively involved in a law enforcement capacity in crowd control is problematic, although the provision can be interpreted narrowly to enable PSCs to have limited crowd control functions but only when they arise in the course of their protection duties.
Adequate Planning and Risk Assessment
The UN's Policy on PSCs 2012 envisages PSCs being used by the UN on an 'exceptional basis … when threat conditions and programme need warrant it'. 63 This is further elaborated upon to make it clear that security will be drawn from the host state, TCNs or the UN's own security officers first. 64 The Policy understands security in quite a limited sense of the security and protection of UN personnel, and the premises and property of the UN, 65 In addition to security risk assessment undertaken under the UNDSS's security risk management process, the UN's Policy on PSCs 2012 envisages tight control of PSCs by the UN with daily on-site investigation and monthly review of performance. 66 The UN's Guidelines on PSCs 2012 are even more impressive in this regard envisaging that the daily review will cover such issues as the safe handling of firearms and their storage, and the quality of responses to training questions and actual situations. 67 The monthly review shall include an assessment of all reported use of force by the PSC. 68 The UN's 'Statement of Works' 2012 declares that review should include compliance by the PSC with the 'highest standards of integrity, competence and performance in line with internationally accepted human rights standards and principles'. 69 The key, clearly, is ensuring that this supervision not only takes place but is thorough and that any violations of human rights revealed by 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 these reviews are remedied, not only by ensuring the removal of the PSC from the postconflict environment and from the UN's approved list of contractors and remedies sought by the UN for breach of contract, 70 but also by ensuring that there is access to justice for any victims.
Investigation and Access to Justice
The 
Conclusion
The UN's PSC policies, guidelines … on PSCs are largely compliant with applicable international law, specifically international human rights law. Furthermore, together they 70 See UNDSS, 'Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies', Annex B. Model Contract. Interestingly the model contract allows the PSC to insert its own use of force and firearms policies in Annex E and F to the Model Contract, but these must be compliant (according to the UN's Policy and Guidelines on PSCs 2012) with the UN's Use of Force Policy 2011 and the International Code of Conduct 2010. There is little attempt, however, to incorporate these standards, nor human rights standards, into the contract itself, which may limit the UN when it seeks remedies for breach. The model contract does use the term 'applicable international law' (which it defines to include human rights law -para. 1.1) in a number of clauses, which could be used in this way, but does not identify in any detail which human rights laws and obligations arising thereunder are applicable. There is of course, a very strong argument that PSCs are not bound by international human rights law (as non-state actors lacking international legal personality) so the invocation of applicable international law is meaningless. If the contract has specifically included clauses to respect the right to life and liberty, for instance, then they would have been binding as a matter of private law, although victims, not being parties to the contract, might not be able to directly benefit from this. 71 UN's Policy on PSCs 2012 (n.5), para.4 .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 constitute strong evidence that the UN recognises that it has human rights obligations rather than mere aspirations. The restriction of PSCs to the use of lethal force in self-defence or defence of third parties under imminent existential threat not only ensures that they operate within the confines of international human rights law, it also prevents them from engaging in law enforcement or, indeed, military enforcement, both of which should be left to the police and military components of the peace operations. Furthermore, the UN's policies can, and should be interpreted, so as not to permit PSCs to use lethal force in defence of property. However, the UN's obligations include providing a right to a remedy against itself for failure to act diligently when engaging PSCs. The UN has not yet accepted this in its otherwise impressive policies and guidelines.
The UN has also failed to drive through human rights obligations into the model contract itself, by requiring PSCs to specifically protect the right to life, liberty and freedom from torture as well as respect other rights -such as freedom of assembly and cultural rights that might be affected by armed PSCs. It could, for instance, have insisted on a clause that required PSCs to compensate victims of proven human rights abuse at the hands of its personnel, although there might be a privity of contract issue here. As with peacekeeping generally, the UN's biggest weakness is in providing fair and accessible remedies for individuals and their families affected by human rights violations for which the UN bears responsibility .   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 
